Abstract-Virtual switches have become popular among cloud operating systems to interconnect virtual machines in a more flexible manner. However, this paper demonstrates that virtual switches introduce new attack surfaces in cloud setups, whose effects can be disastrous. Our analysis shows that these vulnerabilities are caused by: (1) inappropriate security assumptions (privileged virtual switch execution in kernel and user space), (2) the logical centralization of such networks (e.g., OpenStack or SDN), (3) the presence of bi-directional communication channels between data plane systems and the centralized controller, and (4) non-standard protocol parsers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks are becoming increasingly programmable and virtualized: software switches and virtualized network functions run on commodity hardware. The virtualization of such packet processing functions facilitates a flexible and faster definition and deployment of new network functions, essentially using a simple software update. This is also attractive from a costs perspective [69] : Today's computer networks host a large number of expensive, complex, and inflexible hardware routers, middleboxes and appliances (e.g., firewalls, proxies, NATs, WAN optimizers, etc.). The latter can be in the order of the number of routers [28] , [42] , [60] - [62] . Moreover, technological advances as well as the quickly increasing core density per host processor render it possible to perform even resource intensive data plane functions at line rate on commodity servers, i.e., at hundreds of Gbps [13] . The performance of software switching can be further improved using hardware-offloading which is gaining traction. Accordingly, so-called virtual switches are becoming popular, especially in datacenters [41] , [68] .
Hand-in-hand with the increasing virtualization and programmability of networked systems comes an increasing centralization: the control over network elements is outsourced and consolidated to a logically centralized control plane (e.g., the controller of cloud operating systems such as OpenStack [1] ).Hence the logically centralized perspective can significantly simplify reasoning about orchestrating and operating distributed systems.
The canonical example which combines these two trends is Software-Defined Networks (SDNs): in SDN, the control over the data plane elements (typically the OpenFlow switches) is outsourced to a logically centralized software (the socalled controller) running on a server platform. The controller interacts with the OpenFlow switches via the OpenFlow API using a bidirectional communication channel. Especially in datacenters, virtual switches (such as Open vSwitch, Cisco Nexus 1000V, VMware's vSwitch) are popular for the flexibilities they provide in terms of network virtualization [68] (e.g., to control, police, and dynamically handle virtual machine traffic), as well for their simple edge-based deployment model [10] , [29] . Overview: This paper explores the effect of vulnerabilities introduced by virtual switches in the cloud. We consider a datacenter consisting of multiple virtualized (commodity) servers hosting different virtual machines, interconnected by virtual switches. The control over network elements is outsourced to a logically centralized controller (e.g., OpenStack or SDN), interacting with the data plane via bidirectional communication channels. The virtual switch is situated in both user-and kernel-space. We show that an attacker VM (on the left), can exploit a vulnerable switch to compromise the server. From there, the attacker can compromise the controller (server) and then manipulate the virtual switch (on the right).
A. Our Contributions
This paper shows that the virtualization and centralization of modern computer networks introduce new attack surfaces and exploitation opportunities with the data plane. In particular, we present a security analysis of virtual switches. We show that even a simple, low-resource attacker can exploit data plane elements, and thereby compromise critical cloud software services, obtain direct access to the SDN southbound interface, or violate network security policies (cf. Figure 1 ).
This differs from prior research on SDN security, which has primarily focussed on the control plane [51] , [63] . Furthermore, attacks from the data plane have often been assumed to require significant resources [59] or state-level compromise (by controlling the vendor and/or its supply-chain) [6] . In contrast, we in this paper show that attacks on and from the data plane of modern computer networks can actually be performed by a simple attacker. Thus forcing us to revise today's threat models.
Hence, our key conceptual contributions are:
We point out and analyze novel vulnerabilities and attack opportunities arising in the context of virtual switches running on commodity server systems. In particular, we show that, via the data plane and by inappropriate privileges (running as root in user-space), compared to (non-virtualized, non-centralized) traditional networks, an attacker can cause significant harm and compromise essential cloud services. 2) We show that it is cheap to launch such attacks in the context of virtualized networks: an unsophisticated attacker simply needs access to a Virtual Machine (VM) in the datacenter to perform our exploit. There is no need, e.g., to install (hardware) backdoors to compromise a switch.
To highlight the severity of the problem, we fuzzed the packet processor of the state-of-the-art production quality virtual switch, namely Open vSwitch (OvS). OvS is the default virtual switch in OpenStack, Xen, Pica8, among others and is shipped as a kernel module in many Linux distributions such as Ubuntu, RedHat, OpenSuse, etc. Fuzzing a small fraction of the code-base (less than 2%) was sufficient to uncover exploitable software vulnerabilities in the packet processing engine of OvS. The vulnerabilities can be exploited for remote code execution. In particular, we demonstrate how the Rein worm which, starting from a VM within an OpenStack cloud, can first compromise the entire host operating system of the underlying server. From there, the rein worm propagates to the controller and subsequently compromises the controller's operating system. Once at the controller, the rein worm spreads to all the other servers that are connected to the controller (see Figure 1) . At each stage, the rein worm compromises confidentialy, integrity, and availability of the respective servers. We experimentally demonstrate that the rein worm can compromise an OpenStack deployment of 100 servers in less than 100 seconds.
We complement our vulnerability analysis by studying possible countermeasures. Our empirical performance study shows that software-based countermeasures such as stack canaries and position independent executables do not affect the forwarding performance (throughput and latency) of the slow path of OvS by much. However, the use of grsecurity kernel patches [44] does entail a non-trivial performance overhead. We suggest using such countermeasures, especially for userland applications in production environments. Moreover, we believe that our measurement study constitutes an independent contribution of this paper: we are unaware of studies targeted at measuring the performance overhead of different softwarebased security protection mechanisms for virtual switches such as OvS.
B. Ethical Considerations and Impact
To avoid disrupting the normal operation of businesses, we verified our findings on our own infrastructure. However, we have disclosed our findings in a secure manner to the OvS team who have propagated the fixes downstream. Ubuntu, Redhat, Debian, Suse, Mirantis, and other stakeholders have applied the patch(es). Some of the bugs have also been published under CVE-2016-2074.
Indeed, we believe that the specific remote code execution vulnerability identified in this paper is of practical relevance. Virtual switches such as OvS are quite popular among cloud operating systems (virtual management systems) such as OpenStack, oVirt, OpenNebula, etc. According to the OpenStack Survey 2016 [69] , over 60% OvS deployments are in production use and over one third of 1000+ core clouds use OvS (directional data only). The identified vulnerability is also relevant because it can be leveraged to harm essential services of the cloud operating system, including, e.g.: managed compute resources (hypervisors and guest VMs), image management (the images VMs use for boot-up), block storage (data storage), network management (virtual networks between hypervisors and guest VMs), for the dashboard and web UI (in order to manage the various resources from a centralized location), identity managment (of the adminstrators and tenants), etc.
While our case study focuses on SDN, the relevance of our threat model is more general. The importance of our threat model is also likely to increase with the advent of 5G networks [22] and increasing deployment of Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [42] or protocol independent packet processing systems like P4 [7] , [14] .
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We provide background information required to comprehend the rest of this paper in Section II. Section III introduces, discusses, and analyses the vulnerabilities identified in this paper, and derives our threat model accordingly. Section IV presents a proof-of-concept and case study of our threat model and attacks with OvS in OpenStack. Subsequently, in Section V, we describe our empirical findings on the forwarding performance of OvS with software countermeasures. In Section VI we discuss security concepts and packet processing in a broad context. After reviewing related work in Section VII, we conclude our contribution in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the necessary background and terminology required to understand the remainder of this paper.
A. Centralized Cloud and Network Control
Modern cloud operating systems such as OpenStack, OpenNebula, etc. are designed for (logically) centralized network control and global visibility. Data plane isolation is typically ensured using separate physical/logical networks (guest, management and external) and tunneling technologies such as VLAN, GRE, VXLAN, MPLS, etc. A cloud network generally comprises of a physical network consisting of physical switches interconnecting virtualized servers and an overlay (virtual) network interconnecting the VMs and their servers. The centralized control is attractive as it reduces the operational cost and complexity of managing the cloud network. It also provides flexibilities for managing and using cloud services, including VM migration.
Centralized network control in the cloud can be offered in different ways, using the controller of the cloud solution itself or using a dedicated SDN controller. In the former scenario, the controller can use its own data plane to communicate with the data plane of the servers. In the latter scenario, the SDN controller directly communicates with the data plane of the server(s). Additionally, the SDN controller can also be used to manage the physical switches of the cloud network.
OpenFlow is the de facto standard SDN protocol today. Via the OpenFlow API, the controller can add, remove, update and monitor flow tables and their flows.
B. Virtual Switches
The network data plane(s) can either be distributed across the virtualized servers or across physical (hardware) switches. OvS, VMware vSwitch and Cisco Nexus 1000V are examples of the former and are commonly called virtual switches, while Cisco VN-Link [3] and Virtual Ethernet Port Aggregator (VEPA) [33] are examples of the latter.
Virtual switches have the advantage that inter-VM traffic within a server does not have to leave the server. The main purpose of the physical switches is to offer line rate communication. The downside, however is that the hypervisor or host OS increases its attack surface, thereby reducing the security of the server. The performance overhead of softwareonly switching (e.g., OvS) can be alleviated by hardwareoffloading features: While such features were previously only available in expensive proprietary networking equipment, they are currently gaining traction. Pettit et al. [47] showed that the performance of OvS and VEPA are comparable when executing on a remote bare-metal server. OvS performs better in case of large transfers at high rates when executing on the same server.
The requirements and operating environment of virtual switches differ signifcantly from those of traditional network appliances in terms of resource sharing and deployment. In contrast to traditional network appliances, virtual switches need to be general enough to perform well on different platforms, without the luxury of specialization [49] . Moreover, virtual switches are typically deployed at the edge of the network, sharing fate, resources, and workloads with the hypervisor and VMs.
The virtual switch broadly comprises of two main components: management/configuration and forwarding. These components may be spread across the system. That is, they may exist as separate processes and/or reside in user-space and/or kernel-space. The mangement and configuration component deals with administering the virtual switch (e.g., configuring ports, policies, etc.). The forwarding component is usually based on a sequential (and circular) packet processing pipeline. The pipeline begins with processing a packet's header information to extract relevant information that is used to perform a (flow) table lookup which is generally the second stage in the pipeline. The result of the lookup determines the fate of the packet which is the last stage in the pipeline. Note that the final stage may result in sending the packet back to the first stage. We argue that the first stage in the pipeline is the most vulnerable to an attack for the following reasons: it accepts arbitrary packet formats, it is directly influenced by the attacker, and it typically exists in kernel-and user-space.
C. Open vSwitch
Open vSwitch (OvS) [17] , [48] , [49] , [68] is a popular open source and multi-platform virtual switch, meeting the high performance requirements of production environments as well as the programmability demanded by network virtualization. OvS is the default virtual switch for OpenStack, Xen, Pica8 and an array of other software, and primarily seen as an SDN switch. OvS's database can be managed by the controller via a TCP connection using the ovsdb protocol.
At the heart of the OvS design are two forwarding paths: the slow path which is a userspace daemon (ovs-vswitchd) and the fast path which is a datapath kernel module (openvswitch.ko). OvS also has the capability to use a hardware switch for the fast path (e.g., Pica8). Only ovs-vswitchd can install rules and associated actions on how to handle packets in the fast path, e.g., forward packets to ports or tunnels, modify packet headers, sample packets, drop packets, etc. When a packet does not match a rule in the fast path, the packet is delivered to ovs-vswitchd, which can then determine, in userspace, how to handle the packet, and then pass it back to the datapath kernel module specifying the desired handling.
To improve performance for similar future packets, flow caching is used. OvS supports two main cache flavors: microflow cache and megaflow cache. Oversimplifying things slightly, the former supports individual connections, while the latter relies on aggregation: by automatically determining the most general rule matching a set of microflows to be handled in the same manner. The latter can reduce the number of required rules significantly in the fast path and the packets through the slow path.
A high-level overview of the architecture of OvS is show in Fig. 2 . OvS comprises of an ovsdb database that stores relevant switch configuration information such as switch/bridge name, associated ports, match/action rules, port speeds, etc. Necessary bridges/switches, ports, etc. are instantiated using the configuration from the database by ovs-vswitchd. The database can be modified by the controller using the ovsdb protocol. ovsvswitchd also manages the datapath kernel module. The three stage packet processing pipeline is depicted by the extract, match, and action. The datapath kernel module interfaces with user-space using a modular datapath interface. ovs-vswitchd is managed by the controller using OpenFlow.
III. COMPROMISING CLOUD SYSTEMS
VIA THE DATA PLANE This section presents a first security analysis of virtual switches. In particular, we identify and characterize properties of virtual switches which may be exploited for attacks. Accordingly, we also compile and present a threat model.
A. Characterizing Virtual Switch Vulnerabilities
We identify the following properties which are fundamental for virtual switches. As we will demonstrate, in combination, they introduce serious vulnerabilities which are cheap to exploit, i.e., by an attacker with low resources: Multiple virtual switches interact with the datapath kernel module for packet processing and networking. The slow path is in user-space and the fast path is in kernel-space. The virtual switches are instantiated by the ovs-vswitchd deamon which obtains configuration information from the ovsdb-server. The controller manages and configures ovs-vswitchd and ovsdb using OpenFlow and resp. ovsdb protocols over the network.
3) Logical Centralization and Bidirectional Communication: The control over programmable data plane elements is often outsourced and consolidated to a logically centralized software. For communication between controller(s) and data plane elements, bidirectional communication channels are used. 4) Support for extended protocol parsers: It is tempting to exploit the flexibilities of programmable virtual switches to realise functionality which goes beyond the basic protocol locations of normal switches, e.g., trying to parse the transport protocols (e.g., TCP) in switched packets or handling protocols such as MPLS in a nonstandard manner.
In combination, these properties can render data plane attacks harmful: a software vulnerability in the packet processing logic of a virtual swich running with root privileges can be exploited to not only compromise the virtual switch, but also the underlying host operating system. Hence co-located applications and tenants are also compromised (e.g., an attacker can extract private keys, monitor network traffic, etc.). From there, the controller(s) can be compromised. The attacker can leverage the logically centralized view to manipulate the flow rules, possibly violating essential network security policies, or to gain access to other resources in the cloud: For example, the attacker may modify the identity management service (e.g., Keystone) or the images (e.g., to install backdoors) which are used to boot tenant VMs.
B. Threat Model: Virtual Switch
The vulnerabilities characterized above suggest that the data plane should not be considered trustworthy and may not be treated as a black box. It also highlights that even an unsophisticated attacker with very limited resources can cause significant harm, far beyond compromising a single vulnerable switch.
Accordingly, we now introduce our threat model. The attacker's target environment in this model is a cloud infrastructure that utilizes virtual switches for network virtualization. The cloud is hosted in a physically secured facility i.e., access to the facility is restricted. Its services are either public, private or a hybrid. If the cloud is not public, we assume that the attacker is a malicious insider. We assumme that the cloud provider may follow a security best-practises guide [8] : It may therefore create three or more isolated networks (physical/virtual) dedicated towards management, tenants/guests and external traffic. Furthermore, we assume that the same virtual switches such as OvS are used across all the servers in the cloud.
The attacker is financially limited and initially has access to limited resources in the cloud (i.e the resources of a VM). Additionally, the attacker controls a computer that is reachable from the cloud under attack. After compromising the cloud, the attacker can have control over the cloud resources: it can perform arbitrary computation, create/store arbitrary data, and lastly transmit arbitrary data to the network.
IV. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT: A CASE STUDY
OF OVS AND OPENSTACK To demonstrate the severity of virtual switch attacks, we present proof-of-concept attacks with OvS in OpenStack. OvS is a popular and widely-deployed state-of-the-art virtual switch (default virtual switch in OpenStack), supporting logically centralized control and OpenFlow. Moreover, the OvS daemon (ovs-vswitch) executes with root privileges (recall the virtual switches properties in Section III).
A. Bug Hunting Methodology
We use a simple coverage-guided fuzz testing to elicit crashes in the packet parsing subsystem of OvS. The reason we chose this subsystem is due to the fact that it directly accepts input (packets) from the attacker. In fact, to find the vulnerabilities presented in this paper, it was sufficient to fuzz only a small fraction (less than 2%) of the total executions paths of ovs-vswitchd.
In our methodology, all crashes reported by the fuzzer were triaged to ascertain their root cause. The test harness (test − f lows) accepts two user inputs, namely, the flow configuration file (f lows), and an incoming network packet (pkt) to be processed by the switch. The configuration takes the form of flow rules: the list of match/action rule statements that fully determine the switch's state machine. During the switch's operation, an incoming packet is parsed and matched against flow rules. A majority of our effort was focussed on fuzzing the flow extraction code-the OvS subsystem that parses incoming packets. For our tests, we used the American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) open-source fuzzer version 2.03b and OvS source code (v2.3.2, v2.4.0 and v2.5.0) recompiled with AFL instrumentation.
B. Identified Vulnerabilities
We discovered three unique vulnerabilities:
• Two stack buffer overflows in MPLS parsing code in OvS (2.3.2, 2.4.0): The stack buffer overflows occur when a large MPLS label stack packet exceeding a pre-defined threshold is parsed (2.3.2), when an early terminating MPLS label packet is parsed (2.4.0).
• An integer underflow which leads to a heap buffer overread in the IP packet parsing code in OvS (2.5.0): The underflow and subsequent overread occurs when parsing an IP packet with zero total length or a total length lesser than the IP header length field. The fact that two vulnerabilities are related to MPLS should not be too surprising: they relate to the fundamental properties of virtual switches discussed in our security analysis in the previous section. Before delving into the details however, in order to understand these attacks, we quickly review the MPLS label stack encoding (RFC 3032) [57] . In Ethernet and IP based networks, MPLS labels are typically placed between the Ethernet header (L2) and the IP header (L3), in a so-called shim header. Multiple labels can be stacked: push and pop operations are used to add resp. remove labels from the stack. Fig. 3 shows the position of the shim header/MPLS label and the structure as per RFC 3032. The MPLS label is 20 bits long used to make forwarding decisions instead of the IP address. The Exp field is 3 bits of reserved space. If set to 1, the S field indicates that the label is the bottom of the label stack. It is a critical piece of "control" information that determines how an MPLS node parses a packet. The TTL field indicates the Time-To-Live of the label.
With the MPLS label stack encoding in mind, we now explain the buffer overflow vulnerabilities. In the OvS 2.3.2 buffer overflow, the S bit was not set for the entire label stack of 375 labels. (375 labels for a 1500 Max. Transmission Unit size). In the OvS 2.5.0 buffer overflow, the label itself was malformed i.e., it was less than 4 bytes.
C. Weaponzing the Vulnerabilities
To illustrate the potential damage and consequences of these vulnerabilities, we developed real-world exploits that leverage the discovered vulnerabilities. Our exploits, at their core, consist of simply sending a malformed packet to a virtual switch. They achieve one of the following: gain arbitrary code execution on, bypass an access control list of, or deny service to the virtual switch. Our attacks demonstrate that even a weak attacker can inflict huge damage in the cloud, compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the servers in the cloud as well as its tenants. In the following, we formulate our attacks on OvS in an OpenStack cloud setting, validate the attacks and estimate the impact of the attacks in our setup. 
1) Rein Worm Attack:
We provide an overview of the Rein worm attack before describing the exploitation process in more detail. The Rein worm exploits the stack buffer overflow vulnerability in OvS (2.3.2). Mounting a Return-Orienting Programming (ROP) [56] attack on the server running ovsvswitchd from the VM, provides the capability to spawn a shell on that server. The shell can be redirected over the network to the remote attacker. The attacker controlled server can then propagate the same attack to the controller and from there on to all the other servers. The centralized architecture of OpenStack and SDN requires the controller to be reachable from all servers and resp. data planes in the network. This inherent property provides the necessary connectivity for worm propagation. Furthermore, the network isolation using VLANs and/or tunnels (GRE, VXLAN, etc.) do not affect the worm once the server is compromised. Fig 4 visualizes the steps of the Rein worm. In step 1, the Rein worm originates from an attacker-controlled (guest) VM within the cloud. It can compromise the host operating system (OS) of the server due to the exploitable virtual switch. With the server under the control of the remote attacker, in step 2, the worm then propagates to the controller's server and compromises it. With the controller's server also under the control of the remote attacker, the worm moves toward the remaining uncompromised server(s). Finally, in step 4, all the servers are under the control of the remote attacker. Exploit. A ROP attack places addresses of reused code snippets (gadgets) from the vulnerable program on the stack. A gadget typically consists of one or more operations followed by a return. After executing each gadget, the return will pop the address of the next gadget into the instruction pointer. Figure 5 shows an example of writing the value '/bin/sh' into memory location '0x7677c0' using ROP.
A constraint for the ROP payload is that the gadget addresses have to have their 16th bit unset, i.e., the S bit in the MPLS label is zero. We modified an existing ROP payload generation tool called Ropgadget [2] to meet this constraint. To give the attacker a shell prompt at an IP address of choice, the following command was encoded into the ROP payload:
bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<IP>/8080 0>&1"
Worm. There are multiple steps involed in propagating the worm. All steps are deterministic and hence scriptable. To propagate the Rein worm in our test environment, we wrote a shell script. The main steps that are: 1) Install a patched ovs-vswitchd on the compromised host. This is required to have OvS forward the attack payload from the compromised server. 2) Obtain the exploit payload from an external location (public HTTP Figure 6 visualizes the attack. To launch a DoS attack, an attacker simply needs to send the malformed packet out its VM(s). The attack causes a temporary network outage: for all guest VMs that connect to the virtual switch, for the host to connect to the controller and also for other servers in the cloud. Repeated attacks increase the longevity of the outage. Figure 7 shows the attack packet for the Long Shim Attack and the Short Shim Attack. The only difference in the structure of the packets used in the two attacks is that one contains an oversized Shim header (MPLS label stack) while the other contains an undersized (less than four bytes) Shim header.
3) Access Control List Bypass: The Access Control List (ACL) bypass leverages a 2-byte heap buffer overread in the IP packet parsing code of ovs-vswitchd. The heap overread vulnerability is caused by the unsanitized use of the total length field present in the IP header. The vulnerability results in the IP payload (e.g., TCP, UDP) being parsed for packets with an invalid IP header, ultimately resulting in an ACL bypass. In other words, packets that should have been dropped at the switch are instead forwarded to the next hop in the network. In addition, if the malformed IP packets were to reach a router from OvS, it may elicit ICMP error messages from the router as per RFC 1812 [12] causing unnecessary control plane traffic at the router and OvS. However, end hosts are not affected by this vulnerability since most OS kernels are expected to drop such packets.
D. Attack(s) Validation and Impact
We used Mirantis 8.0 distribution of OpenStack to create our test setup and validated the attacks. The test setup consists of a server (the fuel master node) that configures and deploys other OpenStack nodes (servers) such as the controller, compute, storage, network, etc. Due to our limited resources, we created one controller and one compute node in addition to the fuel master node using the default configuration Mirantis 8.0 offers.
Using our setup, we deployed the Rein worm and measured the time it takes for an attacker to obtain root shells on the compute and controller nodes originating from a guest VM on the compute node. We started the clock from the time the Rein worm was sent from the VM and stopped the clock when a root shell was obtained on the controller node. We found that in The steps that are involved in the Rein worm. In step 1, the attacker VM sends a malicious packet that compromises its server, giving the remote attacker control of the server. In step 2, the attacker controlled server compromises the controllers' server, giving the remote attacker control of the controllers' server. In step 3, the compromised controllers' server propagates the worm to the remaining uncompromised server. Finally in step 4, all the servers are controlled by the remote attacker. shell script, and exploit payload). the configuration of the virtual switch and computing power of the node, the outage time may vary.
E. Summary
The OvS and OpenStack case study provides a concrete instance of the theoretical threat model derived in Section III. Indeed, we have demonstrated that the NIC, the fast-path, and the slow-path of OvS are all facing the attacker. In particular, the attack can leverage (1) existing security assumptions (OvS executes with root privileges), (2) virtualization (collocation with other critical cloud applications), (3) logical centralization (bidirectional channels to the controller), as well as nonstandard MPLS parsing, to launch a potentially very harmful attack. This is worrisome, and raises the question of possible countermeasures: the subject of the next section.
V. COUNTERMEASURE EVALUATION
Mitigations against attacks such as the ones we were able to perform against OvS, have been investigated intensively in the past. Proposals such as MemGuard [24] , control flow integrity [9] and position independent executables (PIEs) [45] could have prevented our attacks. Newer approaches, like Safe (shadow) Stack [39] can even prevent ROP attacks. By separating the safe stack (return addresses, code pointers) from the unsafe stack (arrays, variables, etc.), control flow integrity can be preserved, while data-only attacks may remain possible [20] . The downside of these mitigations is their potential performance overhead. MemGuard imposes a performance overhead of 3.5-10% [24] , while PIEs have a performance impact of 3-26% [45] .
Performance evaluation of these mitigations in prior work [24] , [39] , [45] naturally focused on the overall system performance and binary size with applied mitigations. As Table I shows, the available mitigations do indeed increase the size of the ovs-vswitchd and openvswitch.ko binaries significantly. However, OvS performance mainly depends on two metrics: forwarding latency and forwarding throughput. To determine the practical impact of available and applicable mitigation, we hence designed a set of experiments that evaluate the relevant performance impact for OvS forwarding latency and performance. Evaluation Parameters: We evaluate forwading latency and throughput in eight different common cases. We compare a vanilla Linux kernel (v4.6.5) with the same kernel integrated with grsecurity patches (v3.1), which, e.g., protects kernel stack overflows, address space layout randomization, ROP defense, etc. For both kernels, we evaluate OvS-2.3.2, once compiled with -fstack-protector-all for unconditional stack canaries and -fPIE for position independent executables, and once compiled without these two features.
As gcc, the default compiler for the Linux kernel, does not support the feature of two seperate stacks (safe and unsafe) we did not evaluate this feature, even though it would be available with clang starting with version 3.8. In addition, to compile-time security options we also evaluate the impact of traffic flowing either exclusively through the fast or slow path. For the slow path exclusive experiments we disabled a default configuration option megaflows cache. This disables generic fast path matching rules (Sec. II-C), following current best practices for benchmarking OvS, see Pfaff et al. [49] .
Evaluation Setup: For our measurements, we utilized four systems, all running Linux kernel (v4.6.5) compiled with gcc (v4.8). The systems have 16GB RAM, two dual-core AMD x86/64 2.5GHz and four Intel Gigabit NICs. The systems are interconnected as illustrated in Figure 8 . One system serves as the Load Generator (LG) connected to the Device Under Test (DUT), configured according to the different evaluation parameters. The data is then forwarded by OvS on the DUT to a third system, the Load Receiver (LR). The connections between LG and DUT and LR and DUT respectively are run through a passive taping device. Both taps are connected to the fourth system. Data collection prior and post the DUT is done on one system to reduce the possible impact of clock-scew. Given the small values we intend to measure, we acknowledge that some timing noise may occur. To counteract that, we selected appropriately large sample sizes.
Throughput Evaluation: For the throughput evaluation we created files containing a constant stream of 60 byte UDP packets. We opted for 60 byte packets in order to focus on the packets per second (pps) throughput instead of the bytes per second throughput, as pps throughput indicates performance bottlenecks earlier [32] . These were then replayed from the LG via the DUT to the LR using tcpreplay. Each experimental run consists of 120 seconds where we replay at rates between 10k and 100k packets per second, incremented in steps of 10k pps. For the all-slow-path experiments, each of the generated packets used a random source MAC address, as well as source and destination IPv4 address and random source and destination port. For the all-fast-path experiments we re-sent packets with the same characteristics (source, destination, etc.) that match a pre-installed flow rule.
An overview of the results for the slow path throughput measurements are depicted in Figure 9 . Packet loss for the vanilla kernel first lies above 50k pps, while the experiments on the grsecurity enabled kernel already exhibit packet loss at 30k pps. Apart from the grsecurity kernel patches, we do not observe a significant impact of userland security features on the forwarding performance of OvS. The results for the fast path measurements are not illustrated, as we observed an almost linear increase with no impact of the chosen evaluation parameters at all
1 . An impact of the parameters may exist with higher pps counts. However, our load generation systems were unable to provide sufficiently stable input rates beyond 100k pps. Latency Evaluation: For the latency evaluation, we studied the impact of packet size on OvS forwarding. From the possible packet sizes we select 44b (minimum packet size), 512b (average packet), and 1500b (Maximum Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)) packets from the legacy MTU range; in addition, we also select 2048b packets as small jumbo frame packets, as well as 9000b as maximum jumbo frame sized packets. For each experimental run, i.e., packet size for one of the parameter sets, we continuously send 10,500 packets from LG to LR via the DUT with a 100ms interval. The packet characteristics correspond to those from the throughput evaluation, i.e., random packets for the slow path and repetitive packets matching a rule for the fast path. To eliminate possible build-up or pre-caching effects, we only evaluate the later 10,000 packets for each run.
The results for the latency evaluation are depcited in Figure 10a for the slow path and Figure 10b for the fast path experiments respectively. For the slow path, we see that grsecurity (grsec default and grsec all) imposes an overall increase in latency of approximately 25-50%, depending on the packet size. This increase is even higher for jumbo frames. At the same time, also the variance of values is increased by the use of grsecurity. Still, we cannot observe any significant impact of the userland protection mechanisms for slow path latency for neither a vanilla nor a grsecurity enabled kernel. These observations also support the findings from the throughput measurements depicted in Figure 9 , where we also observe consistently lower performance of approximately 25% for 1 We do note that this is different if the megaflows feature is disabled for fast path measurements. In that case we observe a similar curve as in Figure 9 , with packet loss first occuring around 10k later and a higher difference around 20k between the asymptotic development of the values between grsecurity and vanilla. However, to remain compatible with the best current practices in existing literature and as this work's main focus is not the fullscale performance evaluation of OvS, we adhere to the approach by Pfaff et al. [49] 44b 512b  1500b  2048b  9000b  44b  512b  1500b  2048b  9000b  44b  512b  1500b  2048b  9000b  44b  512b  1500b 44b  512b  1500b  2048b  9000b  44b  512b  1500b  2048b  9000b  44b  512b  1500b  2048b  9000b  44b  512b  1500b grsecurity enabled systems on the slow path, regardless of the selected userland mitigations.
Comparing the slow path measurements to the fast path measurements, we observe that the fast path measurements exhibit a reduced latency in comparison to the slow path. Also, variance is significantly lower for the fast path measurements. However, these effects were to be expected. Again, we do not see significant impact of userland security features. Suprisingly, grsecurity does not have a significant impact on fast path latency either. Only in conjunction with additional userland mitigations we see an increase in measurement result variance. This suggests an interdependence of performance bottlenecks in userland code that only surface if the binary is run on a grsecurity enabled kernel. Summary: Our measurements demonstrate that especially userland mitigations do not have a significant impact on OvS forwarding performance. The use of grsecurity kernel patches however does entail a notable performance overhead. However, due to OvS being regularly present on computation nodes and hypervisor systems, the overall system impact of grsecurity makes its use outside of dedicated network systems highly unlikely. On the other hand this also means that the kernel and fast path components of OvS can certainly not be assumed to be protected by the various measures offered by grsecurity.
VI. DISCUSSION
While analyzing existing paradigms for SDN-, virtual switch-, data plane-and control plane security, we have identified a new attack vector: on the virtualized data plane. Indeed, so far, the data plane has been of limited interest with research focussing on the control plane [26] , [31] , [43] or forwarding issues in the data plane [34] , [40] . We however, demonstrate that the way virtual switches are run-namely privileged and physically co-located with other critical components-they are suspectible to attackers with limited time and money as well. This specifically regards cloud tenants. Given these insights, we were able to draft a new, weaker threat model for infrastructures incorporating virtual switches. Following this, we were able to quickly identify an issue that allowed us to fully compromise a cloud setup from within a single tenant machine. To identify this vulnerability, limited time and effort was required: we simply used standard vulnerability scanning techniques, i.e., fuzzing. Thus, the identified attack is not only cheap to execute by a non-sophisticated attacker, but was also easy to find. We only had to fuzz less than 2% of the ovs-vswitchd execution paths in order to find an exploitable vulnerability for remote code execution.
Hence, with this paper, we question existing assumptions and threat models for (virtual) SDN switches as well as for the trade-off between data plane and control plane. Our threat model is worrisome, given that virtual switches such as OvS are quite popular among cloud operating systems.IT, telecommunications, academia and research, and finance organizations are the majority adopters of cloud operating systems such as OpenStack [69] .
The identified vulnerabilities can be leveraged to harm essential services of the cloud operating system OpenStack, including managed compute resources (Hypervisors and Guest VMs), image management (the images VMs use to bootup), block storage (data storage), network management (virtual networks between Hypervisors and Guest VMs), for the dashboard and web UI (in order to manage the various resources from a centralized location), identity managment (of the adminstrators and tenants), etc.
However, we have also observed that existing softwarebased countermeasures such as stack canaries and PIE effectively reduce the attack surface on the virtual switch. They deter the attacker from exploiting stack buffer overflows for remote code execution. While in case of kernel based countermeasures (using grsecurity), this may come at a performance cost (especially in terms of latency), our measurement results demonstrate that the performance overheads of user-space countermeasures are negligible.
A. Security Assumptions vs Performance
As outlined above, our contributions should have a direct impact on how we approach security for virtual switches and SDN platforms. So far, a recurring theme for virtual switches has been design and performance [49] , [52] , [55] . We argue that the missing privilege separation and trust placed in virtual switches are key-issues that needs to be addressed in order to achieve security in SDN.
So far, one promising approach exists that eliminates the hypervisor attack surface in the context of a cloud environment by Szefer et al. [67] . The hypervisor disengages itself from the guest VM, thereby, giving the VM direct access to the hardware (e.g., NIC). While such an approach protects the host running the virtual switch from full compromise, the issue we raised on south-bound security remains open.
Due to the bi-directional nature of communication in SDN and virtual switching environments, an attacker obtains direct access to control plane communication, as soon as a switch is compromised. The consequences of this may be more dire and complex in the context of 5G networks, where SDN is envisioned to control programmable base stations and packet gateways [22] . The base stations are attacker facing entities in cellular networks. Therefore, appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that compromising the base station (data plane) does not lead to the compromise of the cellular network's control plane.
In terms of software security, we find that existing security features, like stack canaries, may not be present for critical functions due to compiler optimizations. Countermeasures such as PIE are not compiled for all packages shipped by the operating system or vendor. This is important because a major fraction of cloud operating systems' users simply use the default packages [69] .
Our preliminary performance measurements indicate that the overhead of unconditional stack canaries and PIE together is acceptable for OvS. Hence, given the ease with which we found opportunities for exploiting a virtual switch, adopting those measures should be urgently done by maintainers and developers alike.
Note that the user-space mitigations would already have been sufficient to mitigate the issues we found. In fact, the OvS user-space has, due to the prelevance of packet parsing [65] there, a much larger attack surface. While the evaluated userland mitigations did not introduce significant overhead, applying grsecurity in our evaluation led to significant impact. This, again, highlights that clean coding and slim and well audited design are crucial for the kernel-space parts (fast path) of virtual switches, as existing mitigation techniques can not be easily applied there. While, e.g., clang supports safe stack, it is not the officially supported compiler for the Linux kernel. Hence, large distributions do not compile the Linux kernel with clang.
B. Packet Processors Facing the Attacker
A key feature of packet processing and forwarding systems in an SDN context is their ability to make forwarding decisions based on stateful information about a packet collected from all the network layers. This naturally also means that such a system-of which virtual switches are an instance-has to parse the protocols in unintended ways or on protocols from layers usually far beyond its actual layer of operation blurring the functionality between switching and routing.
In this paper, the root-cause of one of the issues stems from handling the MPLS label in an unintended manner. This parsing is done to derive additional information to perform more efficient packet forwarding. MPLS, as described in RFC 3031 [58] and RFC 3032 [57] does not specify how to parse the whole label stack. Instead, it specifies that when a labelled packet arrives, only the top label must be used to make a forwarding decision. However, in the case of OvS, all the labels in the packet were parsed (beyond the supported limit) leading to a buffer overflow. Security techniques such as explicitly indicating the size of the label stack in the Shim header may not be acceptable as from a networking perspective that is not required.
Similarly, it makes sense to parse higher layer protocol information in data plane systems to request more efficient forwarding decisions from a controller. Yet, the same problem arises if a data plane system attempts to parse higher layer information in a single stream of packets. As soon as a data plane system implements a parser for a protocol it is immediately susceptible to the same attack surface as any daemon for that protocol. Instead, the attack surface for the data plane system rises indefinitely with each new protocol being parsed.
A possible method to mitigate these conceptual issues can be found in a secure packet processor architecture as suggested by Chasaki et al. [18] : monitor the control-flow of the packet processor in hardware and if any deviation from the known norm occurs, to restore the processor to the correct state. However, the specific approach outlined by Chasaki et al. is limited by the requirement to be implemented in hardware. Furthermore, with protocol independent programmable packet processors gaining momentum [7] , [14] , our findings highlight the consequences of vulnerable packet processors.
VII. RELATED WORK
Attacks in the cloud have been demonstrated by a few researchers. Ristenpart et al. [53] demonstrated how an attacker can co-locate its VM with a target VM and then steal the target's information. We note this work is orthogonal to ours in that their objective was co-locating their VM with the target VM and then stealing that VMs information, while our work focusses on compromising the server itself and extending that to all the other servers in the cloud. Costin et al. [23] examined the security of the web-based interfaces offered by cloud providers. Multiple vulnerabilities were exposed as a contribution as well as possible attacks. Wu et al. [70] assess the network security of VMs in cloud computing. The authors address the sniffing and spoofing attacks a VM can carry out in a virtual network and recommend placing a firewall in the virtual network that prevents such attacks.
Ristov et al. [54] investigated the security of a default OpenStack deployment. They show that it is vulnerable from the inside rather than the outside. In the OpenStack security guide [8] , it is mentioned that OpenStack is inherently vulnerable due to the bridged domains (Public and Management APIs, Data and Management for a server, etc.). Grobauer et al. [30] take a general approach in classifying the possible vulnerabilities in cloud computing, and in doing so, address the fact that the communication network is vulnerable. However, there is no mention that the infrastructure that enables the virtual networks can be vulnerable. Porez-Botero et al. [46] characterize the possible hypervisor vulnerabilities and state Network/IO as one. However, they did not find any known network based vulnerabilities at the time.
At the heart of the software-defined networking paradigm,lies its support for formal policy specification and verification: it is generally believed that SDN has the potential to render computer networking more verifiable [35] , [36] and even secure [50] , [64] . However, researchers have recently also started to discover security threats in SDN. For example, Kloti et al. [37] report on a STRIDE threat analysis of OpenFlow, and Kreutz et al. [38] survey several threat vectors that may enable the exploitation of SDN vulnerabilities.
While much research went into designing more robust and secure SDN control planes [15] , [16] , [51] , less published work exists on the issue of malicious switches (and data planes) [64] , [66] . However, the threat model introduced by an unreliable south-bound interface, in which switches or routers do not behave as expected, but rather are malicious, is not new [11] , [21] , [26] , [31] . In particular, national security agencies are reported to have bugged networking equipment [6] and networking vendors have left backdoors open [4] , [5] , [19] . However, in this paper we demonstrate that a weak (resource constrained and unsophisticated) attacker can impose serious damage: compromise services far beyond the buggy virtual switch, and beyond simple denial-of-service attacks (but affecting also, e.g., confidentiality and logical isolations).
A closely related work on software switches is by Chasaki et al. [18] , [25] who uncover buffer overflow vulnerabilities and propose a secure packet processor to preserve the control flow of the packet processor of the Click software switch. Additionally, Dobrescu et al. [27] developed a data plane verification tool to prove a crash-free property of the Click software switch's data plane.
To the best of our knowledge, however, our work is the first to point out, characterize and demonstrate, in a systematic manner, the severe vulnerabilities introduced in virtual switches used in cloud SDN deployments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an analysis on how virtualization and centralization of modern computer networks introduce new attack surfaces and exploitation opportunities in and from the data plane. We demonstrated how even a simple, low-resource attacker can inflict serious harm to distributed network systems.
Our key contribution is the realization that software defined networks in general and virtual switches in particular suffer from conceptional challenges that have not yet been sufficiently addressed:
1) Insufficient privilege seperation in virtual switches.
2) A virtualized and hardware co-located dataplane.
3) Logical centralization and bi-directional communication in SDN. 4) Support for extended protocol parsers. Following our analysis we derived a simplified attacker model for data plane systems, which should be adapted. Furthermore, we applied this threat model by performing attacks following its assumptions and capabilities. Subsequently, we were able to easily find and exploit a vulnerability in a virtual switch, OvS, applying well known fuzzing techniques to its code-base. With the exploit, we were able to fully take over a cloud setup (OpenStack) within a couple of minutes.
Our empirical experiments on the performance impact of various software countermeasures on a virtual switch debunks the myth that hardened software is necessarily slow. Instead they should be frequently adopted, as they effectively reduce the attack surface on the virtual switch while their performance overhead in user-space is negligible. As our computer networks evolve and networking concepts are shared across domains, e.g., SDN being envisioned in 5G networks, extensive work should be directed towards privilege separation for virtual switches, securing the data plane from attacks and designing secure packet processors.
